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INTRODUCTION 
In granting the dedication of a fifty-foot wide public thoroughfare across Dixie's1 
private property, the District Court abandoned the presumptions, burdens of proof, and 
standards of review for public thoroughfare cases in general, as well as for summary 
judgment proceedings such as those employed in this case in particular. 
First, Plaintiffs failed to provide clear and convincing evidence of nonpermissive 
use by the general public, as admittedly is required to overcome the well-established 
presumption in favor of private property owners and against claims for dedication of a 
public thoroughfare on private property. 
Second, the District Court committed plain error when it declared the public 
thoroughfare is fifty feet in width, despite a lack of evidence of any use for such width 
and the absence of any analysis showing that width is "reasonable and necessary" as is 
expressly required by the governing statute and case law. 
Third, the evidence Plaintiffs provided was disputed by Dixie, rendering summary 
judgment inappropriate. 
Additionally, the absence of a necessary and indispensable party further precluded 
summary judgment in this case. The District Court erred in granting summary judgment 
for Plaintiffs. Therefore, this Court should reverse the District Court and remand this 
case for trial. 
Unless expressly stated otherwise herein, all defined terms used throughout this reply 
brief have the meanings and definitions set forth in Dixie's opening brief to this Court. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS FAILED THEIR PRIMA FACIE BURDEN TO PROVE THE 
EXISTENCE OF ANY PUBLIC THOROUGHFARE 
Plaintiffs acknowledge that in order to establish the claimed dedication to the 
public of the Alleged Roadway across Dixie's private property, the governing statute 
requires Plaintiffs to prove continuous use of it "as a public thoroughfare" for at least ten 
years. Utah Code § 72-5-104(1) (emphasis added); Brief of Appellees, p. 31. Plaintiffs 
also acknowledge that in order to establish the public thoroughfare element they must 
prove use by the public in general that is without permission of the owner, Dixie. E.g., 
Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 311 (Utah 1997); Brief of Appellees, p. 32. 
Plaintiffs further acknowledge they must prove each of those elements and sub-elements 
by clear and convincing evidence. (Brief of Appellees, p. 31). The Utah Supreme Court 
has consistently held: 
The law does not lightly allow the transfer of property from private to 
public use. The public's taking of property in such circumstances as 
this case presents requires proof of dedication by clear and convincing 
evidence. This higher standard of proof is demanded since the 
ownership of property should be granted a high degree of sanctity and 
respect. In addition, 'Ttlhe presumption is in favor of the property 
owner; and the burden of establishing public use for the required period 
of time is on those claiming it." [Draper v. Bernardo, 888 P.2d at 1099 
(Utah 1995) (emphases added) (citations omitted)]. 
Additionally, in summary judgment cases like this one, the District Court must 
view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to Dixie as the non-moving party, 
any dispute of material fact will preclude relief. E.g., Nyman v. McDonald, 966 P.2d 
1210, 1212-13 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). The standard of proof demanded of Plaintiffs to 
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obtain a public thoroughfare is therefore even more rigorous on summary judgment. 
Furthermore, in reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court must "accord no 
deference to the trial court's conclusions of law and review them for correctness," Id. 
(citations omitted). 
Plaintiffs' public thoroughfare claim in this case fails, and the District Court erred 
in granting summary judgment for Plaintiffs, because (even before getting to the issue of 
Dixie's disputes of material facts, discussed below) Plaintiffs did not establish sufficient 
evidence to prove by clear and convincing evidence use by the public in general that was 
without permission. 
A, Plaintiffs Failed to Establish Use By the Public in General 
It is well-established, and Plaintiffs admit, that "[adjoining] property owners 
cannot be considered members of the public generally, as that term generally is used in 
dedication by user statutes." Petersen v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 377, 438 P.2d 545, 546 
(Utah 1968) (emphasis added). Each of Plaintiffs' affiants admitted they own, recently 
owned, or were members of a limited liability company (Plaintiff Jennings Investment, 
LC) which owns, property adjacent to the Alleged Roadway. Plaintiffs therefore properly 
conceded that to the extent they discuss the affiants' own claimed use of the Alleged 
Roadway, and use by any other neighboring property owners, those affidavits are 
immaterial, irrelevant, and cannot be counted towards any showing of use by the public 
generally. (Brief of Appellees, pp. 21 & 34). 
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To the extent Plaintiffs' affidavits discuss any use of the Alleged Roadway by 
anyone other than themselves and other neighboring property owners, those affidavits are 
too vague, conclusory, and lacking foundation to satisfy Plaintiffs' burden of proof. 
Plaintiffs cited the case of Orvis v. Johnson, 2006 UT App 394, 146 P.3d 886, for 
the proposition that summary judgment affidavits are deficient if they state only 
conclusions without factual foundation. (Brief of Appellees, p. 25). That very premise 
and the Utah Supreme Court's recent ruling in Orvis are fatal to Plaintiffs' claims in this 
case. To begin with, under Plaintiffs' own premise, the affidavits they submitted in this 
case do not establish general public use because they merely make general and 
conclusory references to unspecified "people" and a similarly amorphous "general 
public." Not one of those "people" nor one actual member of the "general public" is 
identified. Nor do Plaintiffs indicate how many members of the "general public" used 
the Alleged Roadway, how frequently they used it, the volume of such claimed use, or 
how much of the claimed use was by any vehicles versus just by people walking or riding 
horses that was the primary use referred to in Plaintiffs' affidavits.2 
Moreover, not one member of the "general public" provided an affidavit 
describing his or her claimed use of the Alleged Roadway. This puts Plaintiffs' limited 
evidence in this case in stark contrast with the cases upon which Plaintiffs attempt to rely 
to show public use. (Brief of Appellees, pp. 37-38 (citing Renfro v. McCowan, 2006 WL 
2
 See R. 232-33 (Affidavit of Conrad Bowler ^ 5-6) (describing use by riders on 
horseback and walkers); R. 239-40 (Affidavit of Ethan Bundy Tffl 4-5) (same); R. 244-45 
(Affidavit of H. Val Hafen ffif 4-5) (same); R. 272-73 (Affidavit of Gilbert Jennings ffij 4-
5) (same); R. 278-79; (Affidavit of Mansfield Jenning ffi[ 4-5) (same); R. 283-84 
(Affidavit of Lewis J. Bowler ffl[ 4-5) (same). 
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3254509 (D. Utah 2006); Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447 (Utah 1981); Bonner v. 
Sudbury, 417 P.2d 646 (Utah 1966) (where courts found general public use because 
multiple witnesses, including witnesses who were themselves members of the general 
public, testified to multiple and general uses made by particularized or identified 
members of the general public)). 
Since Plaintiffs' affidavits fail to prove general use by the public at large, and 
certainly do not prove any such use by the required quantum of clear and convincing 
evidence, Plaintiffs failed to satisfy their initial burden to establish that material element 
of their claim.3 As the Utah Supreme Court recently reaffirmed in Orvis, 2008 UT 2, 
*§ 10, the party who has the burden of proof at trial cannot obtain summary judgment if 
they fail to establish a necessary element of their claim. In Orvis, the Court explained "it 
is Orvis, the moving party, who bears the burden. As a result, Orvis also had the 
obligation to establish essential facts necessary to support his claim in order to justify 
[summary] judgment in his favor." Id. at *f 9. However, "Orvis's motion for summary 
judgment failed to establish the necessary elements of [his claim], and thus did not show 
that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment in his favor 
therefore was inappropriate." Id. at <f 13. 
Likewise in this case, it is Plaintiffs who bear the burden of proof at trial on their 
claim of a public thoroughfare. As a result, Plaintiffs, in moving for summary judgment, 
3
 Plaintiffs repeatedly claim that Dixie's discovery responses at R. 265 acknowledge 
public use was so extensive that Dixie could not identify the users. (E.g., Brief of 
Appellees, pp. 13 & 27). That is simply untrue. Dixie made absolutely no such 
acknowledgement. 
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also had the burden to establish all facts necessary to support their claim, including by 
clear and convincing evidence. As shown above, Plaintiffs failed to show use by the 
public in general, which is an essential element of their claim. Accordingly, as in Orvis, 
summary judgment in Plaintiffs' favor in this case was inappropriate.4 
Plaintiffs assert they do not need to provide the amount or detail of information 
discussed above with respect to the claimed public users of the Alleged Roadway. That 
is simply incorrect. That is precisely the amount and detail the Utah Supreme Court has 
required, and for the absence of which it has held public thoroughfare dedications 
improper, for more than 90 years. E.g., Bernardo, 888 P.2d at 1100 (reversing dedication 
granted on summary judgment, noting "infirmities" in claimant's affidavits which merely 
made conclusory reference to use purportedly by the general public but without 
identifying any such claimed users); Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 141 P.l 127, 1130-31 
(1916) (holding that "there was not sufficient evidence of use by the public to effect any 
dedication of the road as a public highway where "the evidence does not disclose how 
4
 Plaintiffs argue Dixie did not raise below any claim of Plaintiffs' failure to establish 
use by the public in general. (Brief of Appellees, p. 27). Not only is that simply untrue 
(Dixie expressly argued this issue below, see R. 131, 288-89), but that also is an 
ineffective and improper attempt by Plaintiffs to shift the burden of proof in this case to 
Dixie. It is Plaintiffs' burden in this case to prove public use. Plaintiffs themselves 
acknowledge that "whether the use referred to in Plaintiffs' affidavits was sufficient to 
meet the public use requirement of the statute is a sufficiency of the evidence issue." 
(Brief of Appellees, pp. 27-28). Their affidavits were not sufficient to meet the statutory 
requirement, so Plaintiffs failed their burden to prove an essential element of their claim, 
regardless of what Dixie did or did not argue below. Summary judgment for Plaintiffs 
therefore was inappropriate, including as confirmed and explained in the Utah Supreme 
Court's ruling in Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, discussed in the main text above. 
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many there are or ever were, how frequently they used the road, by what right they 
traveled the road, nor the circumstances of their use") (emphasis added). 
B. Plaintiffs Failed to Establish That Any Use By the General Public Was 
Without Permission 
It is well-settled that any amount of use, even if it is by the public, cannot give rise 
to a public thoroughfare if such use is by permission of the owner. See e.g., Heber City 
Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 311 (Utah 1997). Pursuant to the general presumption 
in public thoroughfare cases in favor of private property owners and against dedication, 
the Utah Supreme Court has explained that when parties testify about others' use of a 
claimed thoroughfare, "such use would be presumed a permissive use, absent evidence to 
the contrary." Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 101 Utah 1,116 P.2d 420, 424 (1941). Again, such 
evidence must be clear and convincing. E.g., Petersen, 438 P.2d at 546. 
Lacking a single affidavit from anyone qualifying as a member of the general 
public, only two of Plaintiffs' affidavits make any mention or claim at all of whether the 
uses claimed to have been made of the Alleged Roadway by unidentified "people" or the 
amorphous "general public" were permissive uses. Even those two affidavits state only 
that those particular affiants do not recall Dixie ever telling anyone that use was by 
permission only. (R. 234 (Affidavit of Conrad Bowler, % 8); R. 237 (Affidavit of Gilbert 
Jennings, f^ 6)). Of course, those two affiants could not have been, and do not claim to 
have been, privy to all of Dixie's communications and dealings with the entire general 
public. Plaintiffs' affiants therefore have no basis to say whether any "people" who may 
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ever have used the Alleged Roadway did so with Dixie's permission. Plaintiffs' affiants' 
lack of knowledge of and inability to "recall" any communications Dixie had with any 
claimed public user allowing their use by permission certainly is not clear and convincing 
evidence of use without permission.5 
Failure to prove either use by the general public or that any such use was without 
permission is alone fatal to the statutory "public thoroughfare" element required for 
Plaintiffs' claim, and is thus fatal to Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion. In this case 
Plaintiffs failed to prove both of those.6 The District Court therefore erred in holding the 
5
 Plaintiffs complain of a claimed paradox in requiring public thoroughfare claimants 
such as them to prove the public's use was without permission. They argue "[i]f the 
owner knows of unauthorized use of his property, and yet allows such use to continue," 
such use should be presumed to be adverse and not permissive, as in prescriptive 
easement cases. (Brief of Appellees, p. 41). However, it is indeed the burden of the 
party claiming a public thoroughfare, in this case Plaintiffs' burden, to prove use is 
without permission. E.g., Bernardo, 888 P.2d at 1099. Plaintiffs' complaint is an 
attempt to shift the burden of proof in this case to Dixie. That attempt is improper and 
ineffective, particularly since it presumes without proof that any use is "unauthorized." 
Adopting Plaintiffs' desired presumption of adverse use as in prescriptive easement cases 
is contrary to the long-settled rule in Utah public thoroughfare cases that "[t]he 
presumption is in favor of the property owner" against a dedication. Bernardo, 888 P.2d 
at 1099 (quoting Bertagnole, 639 P.2d at 213)(quoting Bonner v. Sudbury, 18 Utah 2d 
140, 143, 417 P.2d 646, 648 (1966)). There are good reasons for this distinction from 
prescriptive easement cases, since a prescriptive easement is a private right and generally 
will therefore be more limited than dedicating a right to the general public to use one's 
private property as Plaintiffs seek in this case. It is Plaintiffs' burden in this case to 
prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that any use by the public was non-permissive. 
Their failure to do so below means they failed an essential element of their claim, and 
summary judgment in their favor was inappropriate. Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ^j 7-
13 (holding summary judgment inappropriate where moving party who would bear 
burden of proof at trial fails to prove all elements of its claim to justify judgment in his 
favor as a matter of law). 
6
 Plaintiffs mistakenly argue Dixie's standing argument is a new one raised for the first 
time on appeal. To the contrary, however, Dixie expressly argued below that "private 
4841-5363-9938 8 
use alleged by Plaintiffs established the existence of a public thoroughfare by clear and 
convincing evidence. This is particularly true on summary judgment in contravention of 
the presumption against dedications in general as well as the summary judgment standard 
requiring all facts and inferences to be viewed in the light most favorable to Dixie as the 
nonmoving party on Plaintiffs' motion. This Court therefore should reverse the District 
Court and remand this case for trial. 
II. PLAINTIFFS FAILED THEIR PRIMA FA CIE BURDEN TO PROVE, AND 
THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN FAILING TO 
ASSESS, THE REASONABLE AND NECESSARY WIDTH OF THE 
ALLEGED ROADWAY. 
Even if a public thoroughfare were properly found to exist, which did not occur, 
the District Court erred in declaring it to be fifty feet wide without any evidence from 
Plaintiffs of, and without any assessment or analysis from the District Court regarding its 
"reasonable and necessary" scope and width. 
The governing dedication statute states the scope of any public thoroughfare found 
to exist under that statute is "that which is reasonable and necessary to ensure safe travel 
under the facts and circumstances." Utah Code § 72-5-104(3) (emphasis added). Failure 
to make a reasoned assessment and determination is plain error and requires that the case 
be remanded. Memmott v. Anderson, 642 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah 1982) (remanding for trial 
persons are seeking to deprive the plaintiffs [sic] of their property with no standing to do 
so." (R. 135 (Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment p. 7)). As shown above, including by their own 
admissions, Plaintiffs are indeed private persons and are not members of the general 
public whose use could give rise to a public thoroughfare. That is why Plaintiffs lack 
standing to bring this claim. 
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on width even after a trial was held in which "substantial evidence of public usage" was 
produced and a public thoroughfare was dedicated explaining: "the record herein reveals 
no evidence concerning the reasonable and necessary width of the [] Road. We are 
simply unable to discover upon what basis the district court determined that the width of 
the road should be 16 feet."); See also, Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910, 914 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996) (upholding dedication of public thoroughfare due to "widespread public use," 
but remanding because "the trial court erred in failing to assess the reasonable and 
necessary width of the roadway"). 
As the Utah Supreme Court explained in Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v. 
Churnos, 285 P. 646, 649 (Utah 1929): 
It is proper and necessary for the court in defining [a public 
thoroughfare] to determine its width, and to fix the same according 
to what was reasonable and necessary, under all of the facts and 
circumstances, for the uses which were made of the road." 
[emphasis added]. 
Similarly, in Bertagnole, 101 Utah 1,116 P.2d 424 (1941), the Court 
stated: 
The purpose for which the [public thoroughfare or public highway] 
was acquired must determine the effect of the right parted with by 
the owner, and the width necessary for the enjoyment of the 
highway by the public.' Hence, while it is true as contended by 
appellant that where dedication is established by user the use to 
which the way has been put measures the extent of the right to use, 
this limitation goes to the kind of use. A particular use having been 
established, such width should be decreed by the court as will make 
such use convenient and safe, [emphasis added]. 
District courts therefore must make a reasoned ruling as to the scope and width of 
any thoroughfare created by court decree under the statute. Such ruling must take into 
4841-5363-9938 1A 
account and assess, discuss, and be limited to, the width that is reasonable and necessary 
in light of the evidence of the historic uses of the claimed thoroughfare. 
In this case, however, there was no evidence whatsoever presented by Plaintiffs to 
show in any way what the reasonable and necessary width of any Alleged Roadway 
should be in light of the uses claimed to have been made of it historically. Plaintiffs 
failed to present a single affidavit or other piece of evidence showing the width to which 
the Alleged Roadway purportedly was used. As discussed above, Plaintiffs failed to 
identify who used the Alleged Roadway, how often, the volume of use, and how much of 
that volume was limited to pedestrian and horse back riders that was the focus of 
Plaintiffs' evidence. In addition to therefore failing Plaintiffs' burden of proof for the 
existence of a public thoroughfare at all, those failures also highlight the lack of evidence 
to support the fifty-foot road width. The District Court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law do not contain any findings as to the reasonable and necessary width 
of the Alleged Roadway, nor could they since there was no evidence presented by 
Plaintiffs from which the District Court could have conducted any such analysis of that 
material issue. The District Court merely adopted without discussion or analysis the 
fifty-foot width unilaterally and subjectively inserted by Plaintiffs into the Decree of 
Dedication. The court below did that without any analysis or findings whatsoever 
regarding whether (and certainly not clearly and convincingly establishing), that was the 
reasonable and necessary width in light of the claimed historic uses. This is plain and 
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reversible error on the face and plain language of Utah Code Section 72-5-104(3), and 
each of the above-cited cases.7 
The only evidence Plaintiffs now attempt to argue in support of the fifty-foot road 
width granted below is a proposed plat map from 1987, and a series of other documents 
making reference to a road. Those documents, however, are irrelevant to, and certainly 
are not clear and convincing evidence of, the reasonable and necessary width of any 
Alleged Roadway which must be based upon use under the very statute by which 
Plaintiffs seek the public thoroughfare dedication, and pursuant to the dispositive case 
law. Utah Code § 72-5-104(1) (allowing dedication of a public thoroughfare after 
"continuous use" by the public for a period often years) (emphasis added); Lindsay, 285 
P. at 649 (stating that courts must determine and fix the width of a road based upon "the 
uses which were made of the road") (emphasis added); Bertagnole, 116 P.2d at 424 
7
 Plaintiffs attempt to argue that the width of the Alleged Roadway is a new issue raised 
for the first time on appeal that cannot be heard by this Court. (Brief of Appellees, p. 42). 
That argument, however, again forgets that it is Plaintiffs' burden to raise and prove the 
width of its claimed public thoroughfare. Plaintiffs' argument, therefore, is an admission 
that Plaintiffs failed their burden below, and that summary judgment for Plaintiff was 
therefore improper. Orvis, 2008 UT 2 at ^ 7-13 (explaining summary judgment for 
party who has the burden of proof is inappropriate where they fail to prove all elements 
of their claim). Moreover, Dixie actually did raise the width issue to the District Court 
below, including raising disputes of fact on that issue as will be shown below. In any 
event, appellate courts can consider issues raised for the first time on appeal where the 
district court committed plain error, as it did in this case in failing its express statutory 
duty to assess the reasonable and necessary width of any public thoroughfare. See State 
v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, f 45, 114 P.3d 551, 561. 
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(finding that "the use to which the way has been put measures the extent of the right of 
use") (emphasis added).8 
Plaintiffs' argument that the Alleged Roadway must be fifty-feet wide as a matter 
of law under St. George city ordinances is completely without merit. The argument that 
city ordinances dictate public thoroughfare width determinations was soundly rejected in 
Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337, 1342 (Utah 1983). In that case the district court had 
granted summary judgment declaring the existence of a public thoroughfare. As to its 
width, the Utah Supreme Court explained: 
In granting the plaintiffs motion, the trial court apparently relied on the 
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City § 42-7-5 (1974), as establishing the 
width of the Dugway road at 50 feet as a matter of law. This reliance was 
misplaced .... It does not address the reasonable and necessary width of a 
highway dedicated to the public .... [Schaer, 657 P.2d at 1342]. 
The Schaer court therefore remanded for trial a determination on the reasonable 
and necessary width, confirming the district courts' duty under the public thoroughfare 
statute to receive evidence regarding and to analyze the "reasonable and necessary" width 
The proposed 1987 plat map also cannot be relied upon for evidence of road width 
because the District Court erred in even making the proposed plat map a part of the 
record in this case. It never was a part of the record below, as shown in Dixie's 
"Opposition of Dixie Riding Club, Inc. to Plaintiffs'/Appellees' 'Motion to Correct Error 
in Record'" on file herein. Despite statements in Plaintiffs' motion to "correct" the 
record assuring that counsel confirmed the proposed plat map was submitted with 
Plaintiffs' summary judgment materials, in oral argument on that issue before the District 
Court on remand, Plaintiffs' counsel admitted: "I don't have a specific recollection of 
seeing the dedication plat in my mind, and submitting it to the court ...." (R. 451 
(Hearing Transcript of August 8, 2007 on Motion to Correct Record p. 4)). Quite simply, 
that map was not filed as a part of the record below, and the District Court erred in 
supplementing the record belatedly to include it. In any event as a proposed but 
admittedly never approved, recorded, or dedicated plat map, that document cannot sustain 
the District Court's ruling of a 50-foot road width anyway in this action seeking a public 
thoroughfare based upon an alleged but not proven usage. 
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of a thoroughfare based on historic use, rather than to defer to city ordinances that may 
bear upon normal city road width decisions. Id. at 1342. Moreover, although Schaer 
states city ordinances may be considered as a part of the road width under the 
circumstances, id., Plaintiffs have failed to identify any city ordinance that would require 
width in this case to be set at fifty feet, and have failed to offer any evidence to prove 
which, if any, such ordinance(s) might apply (for example, to support the arguments in 
their brief as to what type or class of road the Alleged Roadway in this case would be, 
and thus which St. George ordinance(s) to which it might be subject).9 
Plaintiffs have wholly failed their statutory burden to prove, and the District Court 
failed its statutory duty to analyze and evaluate the reasonable and necessary width of the 
Alleged Roadway.10 Summary judgment for Plaintiffs was therefore improper, and this 
9
 Contrary to Plaintiffs' claim (Appellees' Brief, p. 45), Dixie has not acknowledged 
that St. George would require the width to be set at fifty feet. Rather, what Dixie said in 
its opening brief is that "fifty feet was a width unilaterally and subjectively chosen by 
Plaintiffs, likely because that is the width required by St. George City Code for 
development, an obvious and impermissible expansion of the scope of any Alleged 
Roadway and the historic use even as claimed by Plaintiffs." (Dixie's Brief, p. 32). As 
shown above, Plaintiffs' evidence was that the primary use of the Alleged Roadway was 
by walkers and people riding horses. As a matter of law, therefore, under the public 
thoroughfare statute Plaintiffs cannot receive a fifty-foot road for development. As noted 
above, a public thoroughfare by court decree is limited to the uses historically made of it. 
UA bridle path abandoned to the public may not be expanded by court decree into a 
boulevard." Bertagnole, 101 Utah 1,116 P.2d at 424. 
10
 That is plain error as shown by the Memmott and Kohler cases cited above, and also 
under the three-part test discussed by Plaintiffs. First, the error exists because no relevant 
evidence of reasonable and necessary width of the Alleged Roadway was presented by 
Plaintiffs, and the District Court failed its duty to analyze the reasonable and necessary 
width. Second, such error should have been obvious to the District Court because the 
statute expressly requires on its face that the court determine the reasonable and 
necessary width of the Alleged Roadway. Third, the error is harmful because even if any 
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Court should reverse and remand for trial at least as to the reasonable and necessary 
width of the Alleged Roadway (as well as for the entire case at large). 
III. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFORD NO DISCRETION OR DEFERENCE 
TO THE DISTRICT COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT RULING 
Plaintiffs argue (Brief of Appellees, p. 1) that this Court should grant "significant 
discretion" to the district court's findings and conclusions in this case. This Court has 
explained, however, including in the case of Utah County v. Butler, 2006 UT App 444, 
147 P.2d 963, which Plaintiffs cited in support of their above argument, that such 
discretion and deference is extended to only to district courts' findings and conclusions 
made after a trial, where the trial court observed witnesses testify and is therefore 
specially situated for "evaluating the credibility of the witnesses and weighing the 
evidence." Id. ^3. 
That deference is patently inappropriate in and inapplicable to the case at bar, 
which was decided not after a trial, but on summary judgment. It is well-settled that 
appellate courts must "review a trial court's summary judgment ruling for correctness and 
afford no deference to its legal conclusions." Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 95 ^ 5, 61 
P.3d 989, 991 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). That is because, among 
other things, "on a motion for summary judgment, a trial court should not weigh disputed 
evidence." Draper v. Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1995). 
public thoroughfare existed at all in this case, which has not been properly established, 
the evidence shows it would be substantially narrower than the fifty-feet that was 
dedicated by the District Court (and certainly that it may not be expanded into a road for 
Plaintiffs' further property development). 
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Plaintiffs cite Schaer, for the proposition that public thoroughfare dedication cases 
can be decided on summary judgment. (Brief of Appellees at 28). The issue in this case, 
however, is not whether public thoroughfare cases in the abstract can be decided on 
summary judgment. The issue is whether the District Court erred in doing so in this case. 
In Schaer, the Court noted two reasons why summary judgment was granted in that case, 
both of which distinguish Schaer from the case at bar and actually highlight why 
summary judgment was inappropriate in this case. The Court there upheld the grant of 
summary judgment because "the moving party's evidentiary material is in itself 
sufficient," and because "the opposing party failfed] to proffer any evidentiary matter ... 
whatsoever" to oppose summary judgment, opting instead to rely exclusively on a failed 
cross-motion for summary judgment on an entirely different set of facts and an entirely 
different legal theory from the first party's motion under the public thoroughfare 
dedication statute. Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1983). 
In contrast, here, Plaintiffs' evidence below was not sufficient to meet its burden 
of proof in the first place. Dixie presented evidence disputing and legal arguments 
opposing Plaintiffs' motion. Therefore, as in Schaer, summary judgment was 
inappropriate and the Court should reverse the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment and remand this case for trial. 
A. Disputes of Material Facts Precluded Summary Judgment 
In addition to Plaintiffs' failure to meet its prima facie burden of proof in the first 
place, which alone rendered summary judgment inappropriate as shown above, the 
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District Court also erred in granting summary judgment for Plaintiffs where there were 
disputes of material fact. Summary judgment can be granted only if "there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact" and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 56(c). It is well-settled that 4"[o]ne sworn statement under 
oath is all that is necessary to create a factual issue, thereby precluding summary 
judgment."' Nyman v. McDonald, 966 P.2d 1210, 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting 
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 957 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)) (alteration in 
original). In proceedings on a motion for summary judgment, the district court is 
required to view all facts, and all inferences that can reasonably be drawn from the facts, 
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. E.g., Drysdale v. Ford Motor Co., 
947 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah 1997). Also, all facts asserted by Dixie in opposition to 
Plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment were required to be taken as established 
for the purposes of those proceedings. E.g., Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332, 1334-
35 (Utah 1977). 
The case of Draper v. Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1995) is squarely on point 
and dispositive of this case. The district court in Bernardo had granted summary 
judgment, declaring a part of defendant's property dedicated as a public thoroughfare, 
precisely as was done in this case. Id at 1098. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, 
however, because affidavits submitted by defendants opposing summary judgment stated 
the people who used the claimed thoroughfare "were either owners of land adjacent to the 
road" and thus were not members of the general public, or sometimes, were given 
permission to do so. Id. at 1099-1100. The Utah Supreme Court held that summary 
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judgment was improper in that case due to disputes of material fact, noting that the "main 
thrust" of those affidavits conflicted with the district court's findings regarding whether 
people using the claimed road were members of the general public whose use could ripen 
into a public thoroughfare at all, and whether, even if they were members of the general 
public, they used the claimed road with permission of the owners. Id. at 1100. The Court 
further explained: 
Due to [those] conflicting sworn statements, clouds of doubt yet remain 
over the possible dedication of the road to the public. At this initial 
stage, plaintiffs have fallen short of presenting undisputed evidence 
which warrants summary judgment in their favor. Their affidavits 
certainly fail to clearly and convincingly prove their position. See 
Petersen, 438 P.2d at 548. "Summary judgment procedure is generally 
considered a drastic remedy," Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1181 
(Utah 1993), and is appropriate only when the facts are clear and 
undisputed. We therefore reverse the trial court's conclusion that as a 
matter of law the road was dedicated to the public. [Id. at 1101 
(emphasis added)]. 
Just as in Bernardo, the District Court in this case impermissibly granted summary 
judgment for Plaintiffs over and despite sworn affidavits submitted by Dixie which 
disputed Plaintiffs' claims of use of the Alleged Roadway by the general public and 
whether any such claimed use of the Alleged Roadway in any event was without 
permission. (E.g., R. 139 & 140 (Charles Welch Affidavit, ffif 3 & 10)). Each of those 
issues is material to Plaintiffs' motion and necessary for it to prevail. Both, however, 
were disputed by Dixie, thereby creating fact disputes precluding summary judgment for 
Plaintiffs, particularly since the evidence and all inferences from the evidence were 
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required to be viewed in the light most favorable to Dixie and against Plaintiffs' 
motion.11 
There were also disputes of fact before the District Court pertaining to the width of 
the Alleged Roadway, thereby further precluding summary judgment at all and 
particularly as to the issue of width. (R. 140 Charles Welch Affidavit, ^ 11). Bernardo, 
888 P.2d at 1100 (reversing summary judgment where "[t]he affidavits filed by 
defendants also disputed the extent of the road which may have been traveled")). 
The District Court's grant of summary judgment to Plaintiffs must be reversed due 
to the presence of disputes of material facts, and this case should be remanded for trial. 
B. The District Court Improperly Weighed Disputed Facts 
Confirming unequivocally that it weighed the disputed and contradictory facts and 
evidence, the District Court remarked in its summary judgment Ruling that Plaintiffs' 
materials struck the court as "clearly more detailed and analytical." (R. 309, n.l). 
Plaintiffs attempt to shrug that statement off as a mere observation about the manner in 
which the parties presented their respective cases and having nothing to do with weighing 
the evidence. By voicing that perceived contrast at all, however, it is readily apparent 
that the District Court was weighing, measuring, and otherwise evaluating the parties' 
Plaintiffs' arguments about acquiescence based on Dixie's discovery responses at 
R. 265 {e.g., Brief of Appellees, pp. 13 & 27) also fail for those same reasons, i.e., that 
evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to Dixie to show the noted use was not 
"without permission," and thus that it does not establish, and certainly not clearly and 
convincingly, that required element of Plaintiffs' claim. 
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evidence against one another. That is improper, and is grounds for reversal. As stated in 
Bernardo: 
In granting summary judgment, it is apparent that the trial court gave more 
weight to some affidavits than to others. This was inappropriate at this 
stage of the litigation. On a motion for summary judgment, a trial court 
should not weigh disputed evidence, and its sole inquiry should be whether 
material issues of fact exist. [Bernardo, 888 P.2d at 1100]. 
Even if "the evidence on one side may appear to be strong or even compelling" 
(which it was not in this case in any event), quite simply "|"i]t is inappropriate for courts 
to weigh disputed material facts in ruling on a summary judgment." Lucky Seven Rodeo 
Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah App. 1988) (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). "'One sworn statement under oath is all that is necessary to create a factual 
issue, thereby precluding summary judgment.'" Nyman, 966 P.2d at 1213. In light of the 
sworn and disputed evidence before the District Court, and the District Court's 
impermissible weighing of that evidence, summary judgment for Plaintiffs was improper 
and must be reversed. 
C. The District Court Abused its Discretion in Declaring Plaintiffs' 
Claimed Facts Admitted Under Rule 7 
In its opening brief to this Court, Dixie showed that the District Court abused its 
discretion in deeming admitted all of the claimed facts set forth by Plaintiffs in their 
summary judgment memorandum simply because Dixie's prior counsel did not quote 
them verbatim in numbered paragraphs and specifically controvert them line by line. In 
response, Plaintiffs argue only "this court well knows" the cases cited by Dixie "can no 
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longer be used." (Brief of Appellees, p. 15). On the contrary, Plaintiffs' own analysis 
shows the cases cited by Dixie {Salt Lake County v. Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 89 P.3d 
155 (Utah 2004), and Gary Porter Const, v. Fox Const, Inc., 101 P.3d 371 (Utah App. 
2004)) are still relied upon to show that abuse of discretion is indeed the standard of 
review on this issue, and still provide the yardsticks by which courts measure whether 
that standard has been breached. Plaintiffs themselves acknowledge, for example, that 
the standard is that "courts have 'discretion in requiring compliance'" with Rule 7, and 
that "the Supreme Court cited Gary Porter v. Fox" as authority for that standard. (Brief 
of Appellees, p. 16 (quoting Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36). Plaintiffs 
themselves then relied on Bluffdale City v. Smith, 2007 UT App 25, for their abuse of 
discretion argument, including quoting that case's reliance upon and quotation of Salt 
Lake County v. Metro West as establishing "failure to comply with the technical 
requirements [of Rule 7 is] harmless," and thus that it is an abuse of discretion to deem 
facts admitted in light on that basis, if "the disputed facts were clearly provided in the 
body of the memorandum with applicable record references." (Brief of Appellees, p. 16). 
Dixie filed two Affidavits of Charles Welch stating facts which dispute material 
factual allegations set forth in Plaintiffs' summary judgment materials on essential 
12
 As noted in footnote 5 of Dixie's opening Brief, effective November 1, 2003, Rule 4-
501(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration was repealed, and its content 
regarding technical requirements for memoranda opposing summary judgment was 
moved to its present location in Rule 7(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
See Gary Porter Const, v. Fox Const, Inc., 2004 UT App 354, \ 9, n.l, 101 P.3d 371 
(2004). That change in the location of the rule has not changed the application of 
interpretation of it. 
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elements of Plaintiffs' claim (i.e., use by the general public, and without permission). 
(R. 138-44 & R. 290-92).13 Mr. Welch's affidavits were referred to and discussed in the 
body of Dixie's summary judgment memoranda. (E.g., R. 129-37 & R. 286-89). 
Accordingly, Dixie's prior counsel's failure to fully comply with the technical format 
requirements of Rule 7(c)(3)(B) was harmless, and the District Court abused its 
discretion in disregarding those affidavits and deeming Plaintiffs' claimed facts as 
admitted. The District Court should have denied summary judgment based on the 
presence of disputes of material facts in the record even though they were not specifically 
presented in a format strictly compliant with Rule 7, as was done and upheld in the case 
of Anderson Dew Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, t 21 n.3, 116 P.3d 323, 331 (cited by 
Plaintiffs).14 This Court therefore should reverse the District Court and remand this case 
for trial. 
IV. ST. GEORGE IS A NECESSARY AND INDISPENSABLE PARTY. 
Plaintiffs' arguments regarding the necessity of joining the City of St. George as a 
party to this case fail. To begin with, the necessary party argument was not raised for the 
1 o 
Due to an apparent error at the District Court, there are two pages in the record 
numbered 140 (as well as 139, 141, 142, and 143). 
14
 Plaintiffs' claim (Brief of Appellees, p. 16) that Tobias "indicated that appellate courts 
will respect the discretion of the trial courts in deeming a party's facts admitted" is 
incorrect and unfounded. To begin with, Tobias actually held it was proper not to deem a 
party's facts as admitted. Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, f 21 n.3, 116 P.3d 
323, 331. Moreover, Tobias merely held that abuse of discretion is the standard of 
review. Id. It did not hold that any respect or deference is given, or is even appropriate, 
in evaluating whether a district court's discretion was abused. Id, 
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first time on appeal, contrary to Plaintiffs claim. Dixie expressly raised that issue below, 
objecting to the fact that "[t]he City of St. George ... is not a party to this lawsuit," 
despite Plaintiffs' claim that the City owns some of the land which Plaintiffs seek to have 
dedicated as a public thoroughfare." (R. 130 & 135-36). In any event, Plaintiffs 
themselves acknowledge "Dixie is correct that ; a party may raise the issue of failure to 
join an indispensable party at any time in the proceeding, including for the first time on 
appeal.'" (Brief of Appellees, p. 46 (quoting Cassidy v. Salt Lake County Fire Serv. 
Council, 976 P.2d 607,19 (Utah App. 1999)). 
On the merits of the issue of the City's indispensability in this case, Plaintiffs 
argue only that the public thoroughfare dedication in this case will not affect the City's 
property rights. Plaintiffs attempt to show that by discussing a series of statutes to 
ultimately argue that the dedication "held by the state" under the statute actually will not 
change any property interests the City has due to the type, or class of road the Alleged 
Roadway purportedly would be. 
There is, however, a complete absence of any evidence in this case (both in 
Plaintiffs' brief to this Court, and perhaps even more importantly in Plaintiffs' materials 
presented below) upon which Plaintiffs can base any of its above-referenced arguments 
and conclusions. Also, as Plaintiffs' own analysis shows, if the Alleged Roadway would 
be a different kind of road than Plaintiffs surmise, that may indeed change the City's 
interests in the affected property. Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure expressly 
requires that any person or entity who claims an interest relating to the subject matter of 
the action and whose interest may be affected by the outcome of the case "shall" be 
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joined as parties to the action. See also e.g., Werner-Jacobsen v. Bednarik, 946 P.2d 744, 
747 (Utah App. 1997); Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1130 (Utah 1990). 
Accordingly, since Plaintiffs' own evidence presented below showed that parts of the 
Alleged Roadway were either subject to an easement in favor of or may indeed have been 
owned by St. George {e.g., R. 171-72 (Affidavit of David Elwess, title searcher, ffi[ 5 
& 19)), St. George had a property interest in the Alleged Roadway that could have been 
(and may have been) adversely affected by a finding of public dedication. St. George 
therefore is a necessary and indispensable party that was required to be joined to this 
case, and still must be, before any public thoroughfare could be declared. Having 
themselves presented the evidence of St. George's potential interests, Plaintiffs cannot 
now be heard to deny the legal consequences attendant to such evidence. The District 
Court's failure to conduct the two-step analysis required under Rule 19 to at least analyze 
St. George's indispensability to this case is reversible error. E.g., Landes v. Capital City 
Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1130 (Utah 1990); Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 945 , 
(Utah App. 1989). 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court erred in declaring a portion of the Dixie Property dedicated and 
abandoned as a public highway on Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs 
failed their burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, all the elements required 
for dedication of private property as a public thoroughfare, particularly on summary 
judgment where there were disputed facts on required elements of Plaintiffs' claim as to 
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whether any claimed use was by the public in general, whether it was without permission, 
and what the scope and width of any Alleged Roadway should be in light of the claimed 
historical use. The District Court also abused its discretion in declaring Plaintiffs' 
claimed facts as admitted by Dixie where they were actually disputed by sworn affidavit. 
The District Court's failure to make any analysis or evaluation of the reasonable 
and necessary width of the Alleged Roadway as expressly required by statute also is itself 
enough to require reversal and remand. 
Summary judgment also was inappropriate where Plaintiffs failed to join the City 
of St. George as a necessary and indispensable party to this case in light of Plaintiffs' 
evidence of the City's possible interests in a portion of the affected property. 
The District Court's ruling was in contravention of the standards applicable to 
public thoroughfare cases in general, and violated standards of review applicable to 
summary judgment proceedings as well. In light of any and all of the District Court's 
several errors, this Court should reverse the District Court and remand this case for trial. 
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